

how the *petka* governments created the social stability that allowed the integration of the instrumentalist (known as 'activist') German parties in the mid-1920s. Even when these German moderates virtually vanished from the political scene with the rise of Henlein's fascists in the 1930s, Czechoslovak democracy survived because of continued class consensus within the titular nationality. So while the lack of state legitimacy among the Sudeten Germans (and many Slovaks) led to their radicalization under the economic depression which made political 'arrangements' with the state appear meaningless, the nationally satisfied Czechs preserved their cross-class coalitions which were wide enough to save democracy.

6 Conclusion

Unlike in Western Europe, where nations (roughly) came to correspond with states, in interwar East Europe states were multinational or 'rump' in character. This broke the positive 'French connection' between nationalism and democratic development that has characterized much, but not all of France and West European history generally (Germany and Italy excepted of course). Attempts by 'oversized' states in interwar Eastern Europe to promote national interests were often perceived as discriminatory by minorities; nationalism in 'undersized' states usually led to irredentist claims against (or, in the case of Austria, hopes for merger with) a neighbouring state or states. At the end of the interwar era the dream of democratic nation-building had been fully discredited. Had state been given preference over nation-building – that is, had civic or non-ethnic particularist identities been encouraged over ethnic-based nationalism and 'consociational' institutions established in place of strictly majoritarian ones – then the loss of legitimacy in these 'wrong-sized' states (as measured by nationalist standards!) might have been more limited. Instead, titular nationalists dominated the writing of constitutions and elections while revisionism carried the day in the rump states. The political implications of this national legitimation crisis were evident whenever social consensus broke down. The degree of class conflict explains the timing of democratic breakdown, but the 'national question' was a blunt instrument that could be used to combat social change by conservative elites.

3 Class Structure and Democratization

John D. Stephens and Gerhard Kiimmel

In previous works, the senior author of this chapter and his co-authors have analysed the development of democracy within the framework of a theory which posits that the development and breakdown of democracy is the product of the interaction of three clusters of power: the balance of class power, the balance of power between the state and civil society, and transnational structures of power (Stephens 1989; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1998; Huber and Stephens forthcoming). Our analyses covered over forty countries, including all the countries of Western Europe which became democratic by the interwar period. We excluded, however, the countries of Eastern Europe which arose out of the ashes of the three great empires covering the region. Several of the countries in this region, Finland, Estonia and Czechoslovakia, fit our criteria for inclusion. Towards the end of the chapter of *Capitalist Development and Democracy* which covers the West European cases, we briefly speculate how the inclusion of more of the East European cases, including those that did not become fully democratic, might have changed our analysis of European development. In this chapter, we turn to that task.

1 The theory of democratic development

Democracy is a matter of power and power sharing. This premise led us to focus on three clusters of power as shaping the conditions for democratization as well as the maintenance of formal democracy. These were: (1) the balance of class power as the most important aspect of the balance of power in civil society, (2) the structure of the state and state-society relations, which shape the balance of power between state and civil society and also influence the balance of power within society, and (3) transnational structures of power that are grounded in the international economy and the system of states; these modify the balance of power within society, affect state-society relations, and constrain political decision-making.

Shifts in the balance of power in society, and in particular in the balance of power among social classes, are the major explanation for the overall relationship between capitalist development and democracy. Capitalist development, we found, reduces the power of landlords and strengthens subordinate classes. The working and the middle classes – unlike other subordinate classes in history – gain an unprecedented capacity for self-organization due to such developments as urbanization, factory production, and new forms of communication and transportation. And collective organization in associations, unions and parties is the major power resource of the many who lack power based on property, coercion, social status, or cultural hegemony. It is these changes in the balance of class power that link democracy to development, even though the particular outcomes vary across countries due to differences in the politics of mobilization and class alliances.

The structure of the state and state-society relations are also of critical importance for the chances of democracy. The state needs to be strong and autonomous enough to ensure the rule of law and avoid being the captive of the interests of dominant groups. However, the power of the state needs to be counterbalanced by the organizational strength of civil society to make democracy viable. The state must not be so strong and autonomous from all social forces as to overpower civil society and rule without accountability. The different parts of the state, in particular the security forces, must be sufficiently under presidential and/or parliamentary control to insure *de facto* accountability. International power relations are equally important for the chances of democracy. Aside from the impact of war (typically creating a need for mass support and discrediting ruling groups in case of defeat), power relations grounded in the changing constellations of world politics and the world economy can have a very strong impact on the structure and capacity of the state, on the constraints faced by state policy makers, on state-society relations, and even on the balance of class power within society.

2 The analysis of breakdowns in interwar Europe: the Moore thesis

In our analysis of Western Europe, we focused almost entirely on the first power cluster, the balance of class power. For our analysis of the breakdown of democracy in interwar Europe, we turned to Barrington Moore's (1966) study. He tries to 'explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies [...] to modern industrial ones. Somewhat more specifically, it is an attempt to discover the range of historical conditions under which either or both of these rural groups have become important forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy, and dictatorships of the right or the left, that is, fascist and communist regimes' (Moore 1966: viii). On the

basis of research on eight countries (England, France, the United States of America, Japan, India, China, Germany and Russia), Moore identifies three distinct paths of development. His basic finding is that it is the particular way in which a given society moved from feudalism to modernity that shaped later events and contributed to the development of communism, fascism, or parliamentary democracy.

Here we are concerned with his analysis of the social and historical origins of modern capitalist authoritarianism. In his book this *authoritarian-reactionary route* is represented by Germany and Japan which later turned to fascism. The critical condition for the development of modern capitalist authoritarianism is the development of a coalition of large landowners, the crown (the monarch, bureaucracy, and military – that is, the state), and a politically dependent bourgeoisie of medium strength. The following factors lead to the development of such a coalition:

- 1 The landed upper classes must be the politically dominant force in the modern era (that is, late nineteenth century) and must retain a significant amount of power in a 'democratic interlude'.
- 2 The maintenance of peasant agriculture under landlords oriented to the market but employing political rather than market control of labour (labour-repressive agriculture in Moore's terms) in the modern era is a second essential feature of the path to authoritarianism. The method of labour control leads the landlords to seek an alliance with those in control of the means of coercion, the state, and it accounts for the strong anti-democratic impulse of the aristocracy (Moore 1966: 435).
- 3 The country has to have experienced sufficient industrialization so that the bourgeoisie is a politically significant actor, but it cannot be more politically powerful than the landed classes. Thus, the bourgeoisie is the weaker, dependent partner in the coalition.
- 4 The bourgeoisie is kept in a politically dependent position as industrialization is aided, and to some extent directed, by the state through protection, state credits to industrialists, state development of infrastructure, promotion of modern skills, and even state development of enterprises later handed over to private entrepreneurs. This is the core element of a 'revolution from above' by a strong state, and it could occur only after the English development demonstrated the possibility of capitalist industrialization. Militarism, and thus armaments production, seal the bourgeoisie into the state-landlord dominated coalition and its reactionary and imperialistic politics. Furthermore, a state with a sufficient capacity to repress social unrest, that is, peasant (and worker) protest, is an essential element of the authoritarian coalition of social forces.
- 5 Finally, there must have been no previous revolutionary break with the past. Thus, peasant revolutionary potential must be low (for the opposite reasons mentioned in the case of the peasant revolutions), or else the

whole process, in particular the power of the landlords, would have been broken earlier.

It should be noted, however, that while the coalition of the state, labour-repressive landlords, and a dependent bourgeoisie seems to be an essential feature of the authoritarian path, these five factors may simply contribute to the outcome, that is, may make it more probable, without being deterministic. In developing this list, we have focused on elements which come closest to being necessary conditions, but other contributing conditions could have been added.

Two final points on Moore's argument involve the problematic characterization of the outcome 'fascism' and the path from traditional pre-democratic authoritarian regimes (ruled by Moore's authoritarian coalition) to the interwar fascist regimes. In his chapter on fascism Moore's treatment of this period is extremely brief and is based largely on the German case. His argument is as follows: Fascism required mass mobilization. What developed initially was not fascism but royal authoritarianism, in which there was some mobilization but mostly against the regime, not by it. In this period, the landed class successfully promoted its authoritarian ideology among the peasantry. This royal authoritarianism was broken by the First World War, the subsequent democratic regime was not due to internal developments. The landed upper class retained a substantial amount of power in this democratic interlude not only in the countryside but also in the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the army (that is, the state). It allied with fascism, which was based in the urban middle class and the independent peasantry, who felt squeezed between labour and capital and who were open to fascism's extreme nationalist and authoritarian ideology in part because of the previous indoctrination by the landed upper class.

Now, if one were to suggest that a country had to fit this description for Moore's thesis to be correct, only Germany would really support his argument, leaving other cases like Italy or Austria aside. A less strict and more useful test of Moore's thesis may look like the following: does the existence of certain pre-industrial agrarian class relations (labour-repressive agriculture) in general, and more specifically the presence of the state-landlord-dependent bourgeoisie coalition, distinguish the countries that succumbed to modern capitalist authoritarianism (fascist or otherwise) in the interwar period from those where democracy survived? Can difficulties in the initial transition to democracy and the events leading to the subsequent breakdown – be it more generally in the authoritarian variant or more specifically in the fascist – be traced to the pattern of class-state relations identified by Moore? In order to answer these questions we follow the advice of Juan Linz (1976) who consistently argued for the inclusion of the broadest range of comparable cases in order to increase the variation in the possible explanatory variables and to increase the possibility of control for confounding

factors. This implies that we also look at the smaller countries Moore ignored, contending that the 'decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries' (Moore 1966: xliii).

In contrast to our previous studies (Stephens 1989; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992), we include here all the states covered in the *Crisis, Compromise, Collapse* research project, a number of which had not been sovereign states in the late nineteenth century but incorporated in other states. This applies to both later democratic and authoritarian cases. Within the former group there are Finland, which had been part of Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century; Ireland, which had belonged to the United Kingdom; and Czechoslovakia, which had been incorporated in the Habsburg empire. Among the authoritarian cases are Hungary and Austria, which also had been part of the Habsburg monarchy; Estonia, which had been Russian territory; and Poland, which had been divided between Russia, Prussia/Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. All these countries emerged from the turmoil of the First World War as sovereign states. Moreover, Greece and Romania experienced major changes in territory concurrent with the end of the war or shortly afterwards. We also include in this analysis Portugal, which was a parliamentary competitive regime but not a full democracy.

The inclusion of Eastern Europe complicates our analysis not simply because we now have to deal with the problems of state consolidation, but also because in contrast to the national states of Western Europe, these countries did not have long-standing identities as *nation-states*. Thus, we are dealing with unconsolidated states, polities and nations, which problematizes any explanation that posits the primacy of class structure in explaining the political outcomes. On the positive side, the addition of cases, by increasing the range of variation on independent variables such as state and nation consolidation and level of development, provides a more severe test for the robustness of our theory.

3 The transition to democracy in Western Europe

The definition of democracy we employ in our analysis is in line with the formal and institutional one by Robert Dahl (1971). Accordingly, a polity is democratic if (1) representatives are elected by universal (male, at least) suffrage; (2) the government is held responsible through cabinet responsibility to parliament or a popularly elected presidency, and (3) there are provisions guaranteeing freedom of political activity (freedom of association, secret ballot, freedom of the press, and so on). In 1870, only one country in Europe was democratic according to these criteria. By 1920, the overwhelming majority were. Two decades later, democratic rule had crumbled again in a number of these countries. What had brought democracy about? What separated the democratic survivors from the cases of breakdown?

Moore's analysis focuses heavily on the type of agricultural arrangements and labour-force control adopted by the landed aristocracy. Had Moore included the smaller European countries, his analysis would certainly have begun with the existence (or absence) of a politically powerful landed class. This, in turn, is largely a product of the pattern of concentration of landholdings itself: in all of the small countries, there were too few large estates to support the development of a politically significant class of large landowners. This factor already prevents the development of the class coalition that Moore argues is fatal for democracy. In fact, the correlation between the strength of large landlords and the survival or breakdown of democracy in the interwar period (Table 3.1) indicates that this factor provides a powerful explanation for the survival or demise of democracy. It should be noted, however, that large landholdings may not be 'dominant' in a statistical sense. In Germany, the west and south, the major portion of the country in land area, were dominated by small farming, as was the north of Italy (except for the Po valley). Spain and Austria-Hungary also contained regions in which small landholding was dominant. The critical

factor here is that in all these countries there was a sufficient number of large estates to give rise to the formation of a politically powerful landed elite. In many of the small countries, by contrast, small-to-moderate holdings were the dominant form of land ownership and no large agrarian elite existed.

Before proceeding further a few remarks on the strength of the agrarian elites indicated in Table 3.1 must be made. Historically, the French agrarian elite had been very powerful, but the revolution had broken its power. By the late nineteenth century, the French countryside was dominated by small peasants, and the landed upper classes were no longer the powerful political actors they had been a century earlier. Thus, the revolutionary break from the past that Moore hypothesizes as a necessary feature for democratic development was essential in the French case. However, as Katzenstein (1985) points out, most of the small states in Europe did not experience a revolutionary break but nonetheless developed in a democratic direction. Moore's analysis, therefore, is flawed by the exclusion of the small states. The virtually perfect correlation between country size and landlord strength is no accident. As Tilly (1975: 40-4) emphasizes, military success was one factor that distinguished the successful state builders from the unsuccessful ones, and success in war was greatly facilitated by strong coalitions between the central power and major segments of the agrarian elite. The small states avoided being swallowed up only by reason of geography, the operation of the interstate system from the Treaty of Westphalia onward, or both.

Britain stands out as one deviant case in terms of landholding, and a resort to Moore's emphasis on the type of commercialized agriculture as an explanatory factor is necessary to bring this case into line (see Table 3.2). It is also accurate to classify the authoritarian cases - with the notable exception of Greece - Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Germany and Italy as cases in which 'labour-repressive' agriculture dominated. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia has all the antecedent characteristics identified by Moore yet it ends the interwar period as a democracy. Nevertheless, predicting 16 of 18 cases correctly on the basis of agrarian class relations alone is impressive. Still, while the correlations presented here are suggestive of the causes of breakdown, we must examine the individual cases in our sample to uncover what social forces produced democracy and what forces and dynamics appear to explain the relationship between landed class strength and the political outcome.

By the eve of the First World War, a handful of countries had become democratic: Switzerland (1848) was the trailblazer, followed by France (1877) and Norway (1898). In 1915, Denmark joined this group. These are all nations of smallholders, urban petty bourgeoisie, and with a significant though not nearly dominant industrial sector (and therefore significant working and capitalist classes) at the time of democratization. As we shall see repeatedly in this chapter, autonomous and successful intervention on the part of small farmers only occurs in countries without a powerful landed

Table 3.1 Agrarian elites and political outcomes

	Strength of agrarian elite in late end of the interwar period nineteenth century	
	Weak	Strong
Democracy	Belgium Finland ^a France Ireland ^b Netherlands Sweden	UK Czechoslovakia ^c
Authoritarian regime	Greece	Poland ^d Portugal Spain Austria ^e Estonia ^e Germany Hungary ^c Italy Romania

^a No sovereign state in the nineteenth century, part of Russia.

^b No sovereign state in the nineteenth century, part of the UK.

^c No sovereign state in the nineteenth century, part of Austria-Hungary.

^d No sovereign state in the nineteenth century, divided between Russia, Prussia/Germany and Austria-Hungary.

^e No sovereign state in the nineteenth century, part of Russia.

Table 3.2 The social and historical constellation (1850–1900) and political outcome in the interwar period^a

	Agrarian elite politically very significant	Agrarian elite engaged in labour-repressive agriculture	Bourgeoisie politically significant but less powerful than agrarian elite	Bourgeoisie dependent partner in coalition	Revolutionary break from the past
Democratic outcome					
Belgium	no	no	no	no	no
Czechoslovakia	yes	yes?	no	no	no
Finland	no	no	no	no	no
France	no	no	no	no	yes
Ireland	no	no	no	no	no
Netherlands	no	no	no	no	no
Sweden	no	no	no	no	no
United Kingdom	yes	no	no	no	yes
Authoritarian outcome					
Austria	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Estonia	yes	yes	no	no	no
Germany	yes	yes	yes?	yes	no
Greece	no	no	no	no	no
Hungary	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Italy	yes	yes	no	no	no
Poland	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Portugal	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Romania	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Spain	yes	yes	yes	yes	no

^a All evaluations of strength of the various forces etc. are for the last half of the nineteenth century.

Sources: Stephens (1989) and the respective case studies in Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell (2000).

upper class and it is certainly this characteristic of the social structure that was responsible for the early political influence of farmers. The industrial working class was quite small at the time of the democratic transition and played little or no role in the transition. These were agrarian democracies.

In France, the various Republican factions of the late 1860s and 1870s, which provided the final push to democracy, were supported by the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, segments of the peasantry (depending on local economic organization, the influence of the Catholic clergy and revolutionary traditions), and segments of the bourgeoisie, especially in the provinces. The events of the late Second Empire clearly build on earlier democratic advances (particularly 1848) which, though thwarted, continued

to influence the course of events. In these developments, the bourgeois influence was weaker, and rebellions of the largely artisanal working class played a much larger role.

In the rest of Western Europe, but particularly among the antagonists in the war, the social dislocations caused by the war contributed to the breakthrough of democracy. The war and its outcome changed the balance of power in society, strengthening the working class and weakening the upper classes. The ruling class was discredited, particularly in the defeated countries. Labour support was necessary, at home for the production effort, on the front for the first mass mobilization, mass conscription war of this scale and duration. And, finally, the war economy and mass conscription strengthened the hand of labour in the economy, enabling it to extract concessions for the coming period of peace. One indicator of the change in class power was the swell in labour organization from an average pre-war level of 9 per cent of the labour force to a post-war peak of 30 per cent in the antagonists, which experienced the transition to democracy in this period (1918 or 1919). Organization more than doubled in the two non-participants (Sweden and the Netherlands) which experienced the same transition at this time (Stephens 1979: 115). In all these countries the working class played a key, usually the key, role in the transition to democracy. But, as Therborn (1977) notes, the working class was not strong enough alone. It needed allies or unusual conjunctures of events to effect the introduction of democracy. As an indicator of this it could be pointed out that in no case did the working-class parties receive electoral majorities even after the introduction of universal suffrage.

In Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland, it can be argued that the war only accelerated the introduction of democracy. In each country, the pro-democratic coalition – the parties and the underlying alignment of social forces – had formed before or was in the process of formation. In most cases, this coalition had been responsible for previous suffrage extensions, such as the 1907 reform in Sweden or the 1893 reform in Belgium. In these countries, the agrarian elites were too weak to be a significant political force. In Sweden, the peasantry was split on the question of universal suffrage. It was the Liberals (who were based among the urban middle classes, the dissenting religions, and the small farmers in the north and west) who joined the Social Democrats in the push for suffrage extension. The war stimulated the Conservative capitulation in Sweden, and an interparty compromise, implemented in 1917, followed several decades of political pressure (through strikes, demonstrations, and parliamentary obstruction) by the Social Democrats and the trade unions in cooperation with segments of the middle class. In Belgium, the Workers' Party, after decades of struggle, including six general strikes, found support in the Social Christian wing of the Catholic party, which was based on working-class Catholics (Fitzmaurice 1983; Lorwin 1966; Therborn 1977: 12, 25).

In the Netherlands, similar divisions among the religious parties and the liberals produced possibilities of alliances for the Social Democrats (Daalder 1966: 203-11). It is worth emphasizing that the accounts of the transition in both Low Countries make it clear that the growing importance of the working class created the pressures that moved the non-socialist parties towards a more democratic posture. In part, this pressure was transmitted by workers and artisans, already mobilized by self-help societies and trade unions, who joined these parties, and, in part, the pressure was a result of the efforts of these parties to compete with the Social Democrats for the loyalties of unmobilized workers. In the Irish case it is important to note that the country achieved independence and statehood in 1921 after a long history of British rule; a democratic political system then emerged with the constitution of 1923 and the political landscape in Ireland was largely a result of the positions of the respective social and political groups towards the relationship with the United Kingdom.

The British case is singular in so many ways, in both the antecedents of democracy and the process of democratization, that it is virtually impossible to decide which factor(s) was (were) the most important one(s) in a comparative sense. Various analysts have argued that it was the absence of labour-repressive agriculture (Moore 1966), the absence of a bureaucratic state and standing army (Skocpol 1979), or the independence of the bourgeoisie due to the country's status as an early industrializer (Kurth 1979) that separates Britain from Germany and the other authoritarian cases, because late industrialization was often associated with tariff protection policies for industry and agriculture and state intervention in the economy that facilitated the formation or strengthening of Moore's landlord-state-bourgeoisie coalition (see Senghaas 1985). To these, we may add an argument based on our interpretation of the relationship between development and democracy and combined with Moore's arguments on the role of landlords and the elimination of the 'peasant question' in Britain. Relative to the level of industrialization, and thus the configuration of the class structure, democracy came late to Britain. By the time of the first suffrage extensions to the working class in the late 1860s, less than one-fifth of the labour force was engaged in agriculture, and over two-fifths were in mining, manufacturing, and construction (Mitchell 1978: 51-64). Almost no other European country had such a labour-force profile, and corresponding class structure, until after the First - in some cases the Second World War. Thus, when comparing Britain with other large landholding cases (the authoritarian cases) during this same period, one must keep in mind that the latter were much more agricultural and that the landlords had much more economic power and thus, potentially, political power, and the working class was a much less important potential force in the country.

The prevailing view of suffrage extension in the British case, apparently shared by Moore, argues that the 'peculiarities of English history' (however

specified) meant that segments of the British upper classes had settled into a pattern of peaceful political competition by the mid-nineteenth century, and this extended to competition for working-class votes, which resulted in the suffrage extensions of 1867 and 1884. The comparative analysis of the transition to democracy suggests that in Britain this process in itself, if it were true, would be a peculiarity. In no other case did middle-class-based (and largely upper-class-led) parties unilaterally extend effective suffrage to substantial sections of the working class (except where suffrage was irrelevant to the actual governing of the country because of the lack of parliamentary government, as in Germany, or because of electoral corruption, as in Spain and Italy). At best, some sections of the middle classes (and in France, some segments of the bourgeoisie) allied with the working-class parties for such suffrage extensions.

On deeper examination, this view appears to be flawed. The reforms were in large part a response to working-class pressure beginning at least as early as the Chartist movement, the main demand of which was universal suffrage, and which was extended throughout the nineteenth century. In this regard, the British case bears some resemblance to the French case, as the final transition to democracy was in part a delayed response to earlier working-class agitation that predated the formation of late nineteenth-century social democratic parties. Nonetheless it is a peculiarity that the final political initiation of the reforms came from upper-class-led parties without a strong working-class base. Another part of the explanation lies in the late development of the Labour party itself. The Liberals and the Tories were willing to extend the right to vote to workers only because they hoped to benefit from the votes of the newly enfranchised groups. Had a substantial Labour party already commanded the loyalty of workers, the established parties would certainly have been reluctant to make such a move. If this argument is correct, it also suggests that the absence of a significant socialist working-class party in France in the late 1860s and 1870s may have contributed to the willingness of significant sections of the bourgeoisie to support parliamentary government based on universal male suffrage.

Finally, the reform of 1918, which established universal male suffrage and eliminated all but minor provisions for multiple voting, was the culmination of the Labour-Liberal cooperation that had led to the rise of the Labour party. No one would deny the important role of the working class in this reform. Rather, it is contended that the reform was of minor significance compared with the 1867 and 1884 reforms. Blewett's (1965) careful study demonstrates that this is a mistake. Although 88 per cent of the adult male population would have qualified to vote in 1911 were it not for complications and limitations in the registration procedures, which were biased against the working class, less than two-thirds were on the voting rolls. The importance of these restrictions can be seen from the fact that this figure rose to 95 per cent after the 1918 reforms (Matthew et al. 1976: 731).

Moreover, in 1911, half a million of the eight million voters were plural voters, and needless to say not many of them were working class. The importance of the 1918 reforms is underlined by Matthew et al. (1976), who demonstrate that the reform was critical in allowing Labour to displace the Liberals as the second party in an essentially two-party system.

Portugal is singular among the national states in Western Europe in that it did not make the transition to full democracy in this period. There were literacy qualifications for voting and given the extremely high level of illiteracy, large segments of the adult population were excluded from the political process. Moreover, as one can see from Costa Pinto's (2000) contribution, the parliamentary regime that was established was very unstable (also see Marques 1972). Our theory, building on Moore, offers a straightforward explanation for the political development in Portugal. At this time Portugal was an overwhelmingly agrarian country and the urban working class was numerically weak and poorly organized. Thus, one would expect a weak push for full democracy. Given the agrarian structure, large landholders dependent on cheap labour and coercive methods of labour control, the alternative path to democracy, the agrarian smallholding path of Switzerland and Norway, was closed off also.

What can be said so far concerning the development of democracy in Western Europe as has been outlined here? Therborn's (1977) argument seems to be confirmed. He stresses the important role played by the working class, that is, by its organizational representatives, the trade unions and the socialist parties. One can add the role of artisan agitation and early craft unions in the French and British cases and the role of workers in the confessional parties in the Netherlands and Belgium in pressing those parties towards a more democratic posture. The rapid development of industrial capitalism in the second half of the nineteenth century stimulated working-class organization that first gradually, and then with the war and its outcome, decisively changed the balance of class power in the entire core of the world capitalist system. The change in the underlying class structure in the democratizers (that is, excluding Portugal) as indicated by labour-force figures is significant enough: between 1870 and 1910, the non-agricultural work force grew in these countries by one-third to one-half to an average of 61 per cent (Stephens 1979). The change at the level of class formation and class organization was even more significant: in no country in 1870 were the socialists a significant mass-based party and the trade unions organized a miniscule proportion of the labour force; by the eve of the First World War, the parties affiliated with the Second International garnered an average of 26 per cent of the vote (despite suffrage restrictions in a number of countries) and the trade unions organized an average of 11 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force. In the immediate post-war elections, the socialists' electoral share increased to an average of 32 per cent, while trade union organization grew spectacularly, increasing two-and-a-half-fold. The organized working class was

also the most consistently pro-democratic force in the period under consideration: at the onset of the First World War, European labour movements, all members of the Second International, had converged on an ideology which placed the achievement of universal suffrage and parliamentary government at the centre of their immediate programme (Zolberg 1986).

This interpretation supports our theory and turns on their head Lipset (1960) and all the crossnational studies which followed; the working class, not the middle class, was the driving force behind democracy. It also contradicts Moore, most Marxist analysts, and many liberal social scientists (for example Dahrendorf 1967) who argue that the primary source of democratic impulses was the bourgeoisie. However, Therborn's (1977) focus on the last reforms in the process of democratization leads to an exaggeration of the role of the working class. First, in the two agrarian democracy cases (Switzerland and Norway), the role of the working class was secondary even in the final push to democracy. Second, in other cases, not only did the working class need allies in the final push, in earlier democratic reforms multi-class alliances were responsible for the success of the reform (France, Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium).

However, as the experience of the authoritarian cases shows most clearly, none of these other social classes was as consistently pro-democratic, both across countries and through time, as the working class.¹ The urban middle class and/or segments of the peasantry provided the mass base for authoritarianism in the breakdown cases. The bourgeoisie whose role in the introduction of democracy has been emphasized in so many accounts, from Marxist to liberal, played a positive role in only three cases, Switzerland, Britain and France. Moreover, in Britain and France, it was only segments of the class that cooperated in the push for democracy, and then only after earlier histories of popular agitation for democracy and bourgeois resistance to it. In all the others, the bourgeoisie was one of the centres of resistance to working-class political incorporation. It did make an indirect contribution to the outcome, however. In the cases discussed so far, the bourgeoisie sought entry into the corridors of power and in all cases, except for Denmark and Sweden, it supported the drive for parliamentary government. Bourgeois political forces established parliamentary government with property, tax, or income qualifications for voting – that is democracy for the propertied – a true 'bourgeois democracy' in contrast to the bourgeois democracy of Leninist Marxism. This system then was opened up by successive organized groups demanding entry into the system: the peasantry, the middle class, and finally the working class. There is a certain amount of truth in the extremely crude interpretation that each group worked for its own incorporation and was ambivalent about further extensions of suffrage. The positive contributions of the bourgeoisie were to push for the introduction of parliamentary government and then to capitulate to pressures for further reforms rather than risk civil war.

4 The breakdown of democracy

Thus, the working class needed allies, its power alone was insufficient. Here is where the Moore thesis, revised to accommodate the smaller countries, comes in, as it outlines the social and historical conditions that created the possibilities for alliances. In the cases of coalitions of the landed upper classes, the state, and the bourgeoisie, no alliance strong enough to overcome their opposition could be constructed. It was only the change in the balance of class power caused by the war that allowed for the democratic breakthrough. But, as Maier (1975) argues in his study of Germany, France and Italy, this surge in the strength of labour and the political left was quickly, though not completely, rolled back. A quick glance at union membership and voting statistics indicates that this was a general European pattern. Where this surge of working-class strength was the essential ingredient in the transition to democracy, the working class and its allies (where it had any) were unable to maintain democracy when a new conjuncture of forces presented new problems (the depression, worker and peasant militance, etc.) and new alliance possibilities for the upper classes moved the bourgeoisie and the landlords from passive to active opposition to the democratic regime.

This still leaves us with something of a black box in terms of the mechanism by which the existence of a relatively strong class of landlords actually influenced the political structures and events between 1870 and 1939. One might first ask what difference it makes that landlords were an element of the ruling coalition (as opposed to a simple bourgeoisie-state alliance). Moore gives a straightforward answer to this question: the landlords, who had earlier cemented an alliance with the crown/state, exercised a political and ideological hegemony over the rising bourgeoisie, in which the latter accepted the ideological leadership of the landlords, in part as a result of state support for industrialization. The authoritarian politics of the agrarian elite were transmitted to the bourgeoisie. In tracing the state's motivation, one might hypothesize that initially the crown/state made the alliance with the landlords because, as Tilly (1975) contends, the alliance was militarily strong. This alliance was progressively strengthened as the elements of the state apparatus (the military, bureaucracy and judiciary) were drawn from agrarian elites directly or the occupants of these positions were absorbed through accretion or both. All three groups then retained this authoritarian posture in the democratic interlude. To the extent that the *haute bourgeoisie* was drawn into the authoritarian politics of the agrarian elites, it also participated in the social links with the state apparatus, strengthening the anti-democratic stance of the state.

As pointed out earlier, Kurth (1979) argues that the bourgeoisie in some countries may have had autonomous reasons for adopting anti-democratic politics, and a similar line of argument has been put forward by a number

of historians critical of Moore's view of German developments. The main function of a strong agrarian elite in this perspective is to create an alliance option for the bourgeoisie to pursue anti-democratic politics, an option not present in the smallholding countries. This still leaves a problem for the democratic period because even a highly cohesive upper-class alliance must reach beyond its ranks to influence the political developments in the era of mass politics. Three basic mechanisms can translate the power of landlords and the more general anti-democratic impulses of both segments of the upper classes into influences on the events of the democratic period (and the mass politics of the period immediately before the First World War). The first is conscious action, such as funding authoritarian parties and movements, using political influence to obstruct democratic procedures, and so on.

The second mechanism is what is referred to in Marxist theories of the state as structural determination. In a capitalist society, as is argued by Block (1977), any government must ensure that the basic conditions for capital accumulation are met. The threat of investment slowdown and capital flight is a constraint on any government and forces it to take into account the interests of the owners of the means of production, even in the absence of overt pressure from these classes, if they are to keep the economy on an even keel. Conversely, governments that do not have the confidence of capitalists (and landlords) may find that declining investment, capital flight, etc. add economic difficulties to their other difficulties, resulting in a destabilization of the regime.

The third mechanism is ideological hegemony, in Gramsci's sense. In this view, in advanced capitalist societies the ruling class rules in large part through a historically developed hegemony or ideological domination. In the state- and nation-building process, the state-building alliance (for example, in Germany, the Junker-state alliance) produces, in a non-conspiratorial way an ideology that legitimates its rule and its development project (where such a project is present). This alliance can be referred to as the hegemonic fraction of the overall ruling-class coalition (in Germany, the state-Junker-heavy industry alliance). As more social groups are mobilized, as civil society becomes larger, the ruling ideology is diffused to other groups. This attempt is generally successful, especially in the upper middle classes and more affluent middle strata. However, in cases such as Germany and Austria, the labour movement insulated much of the working class from ruling-class hegemony by building, in a very conscious fashion, a counterhegemony through the development of a dense organizational life – the party, trade unions, workers' education associations, sports clubs, youth and women's organizations, the development of alternative mass media and suchlike. Gramsci prescribed what labour movements should do rather than what they, in fact, had achieved.

However, while there is reason to believe that even the German movement did not inculcate all or even most rank-and-file members of its movement

with a clear concept of an alternative socialist society, it did insulate them from the authoritarian politics of the Imperial German elites. Moreover, it is important to observe that the Catholic Church did something similar; it organized a political submilieu for its adherents. The political orientation of this culture was, however, quite different from that of the working class. At one extreme, when the Church was in a minority position and under attack by the state-building elites, it did insulate its adherents from the ruling-class hegemony and became a possible ally for democratic forces (as in Imperial Germany and later during the Weimar period). At the other extreme, where the church itself allied with the state and the large landed class, the Catholic milieu became a stronghold of ruling-class ideology, as in Spain and elsewhere. For these reasons, the political positions of the urban middle classes and the peasantry were heavily influenced by the respective ruling-class coalitions. Where Moore's authoritarian upper-class coalition was well established, it not only affected the content of the ideology propagated by the ruling classes, that is, a particularly hierarchic, strongly anti-democratic, anti-liberal set of values, but it also affected the extent to which the ruling ideology was accepted by the urban middle classes and, significantly, the peasants.

This way of employing the concept of ideological hegemony can be fruitfully combined with other analyses of political mobilization in Europe (see especially Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970). As pointed out there, in Protestant smallholding countries, the peasants themselves were the agents of their mobilization, and the political platform that they created was the agrarian parties. In Protestant largeholding countries, the mobilizing agents were the landed upper classes; thus the political weight of the peasants strengthened this political bloc. In Catholic countries (or certain areas, such as southern Germany), the mobilizing agents were Catholic parties. For a full specification of the ideological orientation of these Catholic parties, it is necessary to bring into the analysis both the posture of the state vis-à-vis the Catholic Church in the Catholic countries and the size of the Catholic community in predominantly Protestant countries. The central tendency is clear: the ideological posture of the parties varies according to the landholding structure. Above all, in all countries with a significant landed elite this class was a key force behind the party that mobilized significant sections of the peasantry (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).

With this last mechanism in mind, the class alliance option argument can be restated. The existence of a strong class of large landholders with close ties to the state not only changed the alliance options of the bourgeoisie. Together, these three groups exercised an ideological influence over segments of the middle class and the peasantry that also pushed these segments in an authoritarian direction or at least prevented them from allying with the working class in the push for democracy, thus reinforcing the viability of the authoritarian option for the bourgeoisie.

One caveat must, however, be added. It is not our intention to attribute, directly or indirectly, all anti-democratic and reactionary impulses in peasant and middle-class politics to the ideological hegemony of the Moorean coalition. This would be clearly wrong, as the examples of the Lapua movement in Finland, Rexism in Belgium, and Action Française in France demonstrate. Moreover, not all mass support for fascism or other forms of authoritarianism in the breakdown cases can be traced to this source. Rather, we want to argue that the existence of a strong agrarian elite and an allied bourgeoisie significantly increased the appeal of such reactionary ideologies in the other classes. In clarifying the status of these three mechanisms, it is also useful to draw on Stinchcombe's (1968) distinction between historical and constant causes. A historical cause is one that happens at a point (or, in this case, a period) of time in the past, and then the pattern created reproduces itself without the recurrence of the original cause. So, for instance, the *Kulturkampf*, Naval League, and Agrarian League propaganda campaigns in Imperial Germany did not have to be carried on constantly to have an effect on the political attitudes of the peasantry a generation later. The direct action and structural mechanisms are closer to (though not identical with) a constant cause, which is a set of social relationships, activities, etc. which are constant from year to year and produce a constant effect. In our analysis, we are concerned with institutional change rather than stability, but otherwise the argument is the same. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that the mechanism of ideological hegemony need not have a close relationship with the current economic and political strength of large landlords or with the cohesion of the authoritarian coalition. Of course, the persistence of landlord power or the cohesion of the coalition will serve to maintain the ideological legacy of the past, but that legacy will not decline in a linear relationship with the decline of landlord power or coalition cohesion.

Space constrains us from tracing the sequence of events in the four breakdown cases in Western Europe (Austria, Germany, Spain and Italy). In any case, we have done that elsewhere (Stephens 1989: 1041-64; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 103-21), so suffice it here to summarize the results of our studies of the four cases. In Italy and Spain, active intervention by landlords and capitalists in support of authoritarian outcomes was found to be of great importance. It cannot be overemphasized how critical the role of agrarian elites' attempts to maintain the control of rural labour were in these two cases. In Austria, the legacy of the ideological hegemony of dominant classes was decisive. In Germany, we argued that all three factors mediated the effect of the historic developmental coalition on the interwar events. The contrasting role played by the mechanism of ideological hegemony in the four cases, its importance in Austria and Germany as compared with Spain and Italy, is a function of the level of economic development and thus the strength of civil society.

5 Democratic transition and breakdown in Eastern Europe

Late state building, polity formation, and nation building so complicate the analysis of our seven Eastern European cases that even the classification of late nineteenth-century class relations in Table 3.2 are problematic, especially in the cases of Czechoslovakia, Estonia and Poland, where no polity existed before the First World War.² Even Greece and Romania, which had existed as autonomous states for a relatively long period, experienced major expansions of territory and population as a result of the First World War and thus major changes in the constitution of the polity. This poses a problem not simply because state and nation building 'get in the way' of class relationships, but also because it is difficult to speak of class relationships until the polity has been defined. Indeed, as Mann (1993) argues, class and nations are mutually constitutive; in the case of classes, the national state defines at the same time the arena of interaction and the target of action. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this analysis, we need to categorize class relations at the starting point, the late nineteenth century, and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 represent our best effort to do so. The tables indicate that one might expect a relatively good fit with our revised version of the Moore thesis in five of the cases and a poor one in two, Czechoslovakia and Greece. Indeed, as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) reveals in a most minimal form, the prime implicants for the survivor cases including the 'logical remainders' indicate that either there has been a revolutionary break (as in France and the United Kingdom) or the absence of labour-repressive agriculture combined with a political role of the bourgeoisie. Conversely, the breakdown cases can be characterized by a strong agrarian elite and the lack of a revolutionary break with the past. However, Czechoslovakia among the survivors and Greece among the breakdowns are notably exceptions from these patterns. More detailed assessments of the deviations and more complicating factors are, therefore, called for.

When it was transferred to Russian control in 1809, Finland was granted considerable domestic self-governance. Its agrarian class structure was very similar to Sweden's and it too developed an autonomous movement of small farmers. Finnish industrialization began late in the nineteenth century and since it was based on the development of wood and wood products, an unusually high proportion of the nascent working class was rural. In comparison with other European societies, there was a very high degree of freedom of association and organization and the unions movement experienced almost no repression (Alapuro 1988: 101 ff.). This contrasted with the system of representation which was one of the most conservative estate-based parliaments and which had remained virtually unreformed since the constitution of the Grand Duchy, as it could only be changed with the permission of the Tsar. With this freedom of organization, the social democratic party, which was founded in 1899, met with phenomenal success and

coalesced with bourgeois groups to resist the new Russian policy of integration. The 1905 Russian revolution led to a general strike in Finland and ultimately to Russian acquiescence to the demands of the Social Democrats (which had been opposed by the Finnish bourgeois political groupings) for universal suffrage and a unicameral parliament. The 1917 Russian Revolution resulted in Finnish independence, thus completing the process of democratization.

If we end the analysis here, Finnish democratization appears to be very similar to the rest of Scandinavia, that is, the results of struggles of the working class and small farmers, save the greater importance of the role of international developments in the Finnish case. However, the failed revolution of 1918 and the civil war put Finland on a different track. The deep divisions left by the events led to the rise of the radical right Lapua movement and the exclusion of the Communist Party from the political system, and thus a partial eclipse of democracy. However, a competitive parliamentary system did persist which Alapuro and Allardt (1978, also see Alapuro 1988) attribute to the smallholding agrarian class structure. The formation of a Red-Green coalition in 1937 restabilized the system (Karvonen 2000) and the Communists were subsequently allowed back into the political system.

Both Hungary and Romania were 'stillborn' democracies, if they were democracies at all. In Hungary, even the widened franchise passed by the National Assembly of 1920-22 contained educational qualifications for voting which were significant enough for the political system not to qualify as a polyarchy according to Dahl's criteria. Moreover, Bethlen, who became premier under Horthy's regency in April 1921, engineered a constitutionally dubious reversion to the 1913 law under which only 30 per cent of adults were eligible to vote (Janos 1982: 212) in the 1922 election. Perhaps more importantly he reinstated the pre-war machinery of electoral corruption which enabled the government 'to fix elections and ensure the return of majorities favourable to their own persuasion' (Janos 1982: 212). In Romania, unrest during the last years of the war caused the government to greatly extend suffrage, and then an interim government immediately after the war granted male suffrage. However, by electoral intimidation and fixing elections in rural districts, electoral outcomes could be effectively manipulated by the government. The political outcomes in these two countries are not surprising. Both were backward and agrarian, thus the working class was numerically weak, poorly organized, and subject to repression, and civil society was weak. Pre-war agrarian class relations also predicted difficulties for democracy (see Table 3.2). The Romanian government did carry out a land reform in the immediate post-war period but it applied primarily to the newly acquired territories and thus fell short of a full transformation of rural class relations.

Estonia and Poland would appear to be quite similar to Romania and Hungary in that both pre-war agrarian class relations and the level of

development and thus working-class strength and the strength of civil societies, appear to predict difficulties for democracy. The weakness of the social democratic working-class movement as compared with Western Europe (except Portugal) and Finland undoubtedly did contribute to the outcome in both countries. By contrast, it is more difficult to make a case for the legacies of agrarian class relations. In both countries, national armies were created in the waning moments of the war and these armies were not linked to the traditional agrarian upper class. Land reform was an important issue in Poland and it is plausible to argue that the large landholders benefited from the Pilsudski coup as the result was that the more far reaching reform schemes under consideration were not carried out. However, it is quite implausible to argue that even indirectly landholding interests were behind the coup as Pilsudski had originally been a social democrat and continued to be sympathetic to the poorer classes and not conservative aristocrats. His agenda was a political one, to greatly increase the power of the executive, and not defense of upper-class interests or exclusion of the working-class movement from the political system, as was the objective in all the authoritarian regimes discussed to this point. Though the regime became increasingly repressive and reached an accommodation with the landed upper classes, its origins cannot be traced to those interests.

The Moore thesis works even less well for Estonia. The agrarian upper class in Estonia was German and thus ethnically different from the rest of the population. This, along with its lack of links to the newly created coercive forces, made it an easy political target, and the Constituent Assembly passed a law expropriating 97 per cent of large estates in 1919. Given the almost simultaneous rapid transformation of the agrarian class structure and the state, it is tempting to say that Estonia did experience a 'revolutionary break' from the past, but it occurred at this point in time, not prior to the modern period as in Moore's West European cases. The coup of 1936 was aimed at excluding the far right from the political system and did not result in the establishment of an exclusionary authoritarian regime (Varrak 2000). Indeed, had the state not been invaded and its autonomy existence ended, one can at least envisage that full democracy might have been re-established and thus that Estonia might more properly be classified with Finland as a case of partial breakdown and re-equilibration.

The thesis of 'modern revolutionary break' applies even more to Czechoslovakia. Again we see the creation of a new army and a thoroughgoing land reform (Bradley 2000). Moreover, other aspects of Czech class structure were also favourable to the survival of democracy. Because of their opposition to the Habsburg state, the Moravian and Bohemian bourgeoisie developed a much stronger and more aggressive liberalism in comparison to their Austrian or German counterparts. Czechoslovakia was one of the most industrialized countries in Europe and the working class was not only numerically large but also well organized both in trade unions and

political parties. True the Communists garnered significant working-class support, but a large majority of workers supported the Social Democrats, the German Social Democrats, or the Czech nationalist Socialists, all of whom supported democracy, differing primarily on the national question.

Greece does not conform to the expectations arising from our agrarian class relations hypothesis. The low level of industrial development and weakness of the industrial working class might be cited as a reason for the weakness of the democratic push, but both Zink's (2000a) analysis for this research project and Mouzelis's (1986) comparative analysis of Greece and the Latin American Southern Cone point to our second cluster of power, state-civil society relations as the primary reason for the weakness of Greek democracy. Both emphasize the clientelistic nature of the Greek polity. As the system moved from the oligarchic politics of notables to the more open system of the post-1909 period, the clientelistic ties were extended and transformed but not replaced by 'horizontal' organization, in Zink's terminology – that is, autonomous organization of social classes and interest groups. The counterpart to the weakness of civil society was an increasingly autonomous military. Venizelos's liberal 'revolution' of 1909 was, in fact, a military coup. With the great strengthening of the army as a result of the Balkan wars and the First World War, the army became a permanent player in Greek politics. As Mouzelis (1986: 105) observes, '... there can be no question that the Greek military, especially after 1922, were not only fully involved in politics, but also constituted a major force in the political arena.'

Conclusions

The central aim of this chapter was to extend our analysis of the impact of the development of class relations on the democratic transition and breakdown in Europe to a greater number of countries, specifically, to seven East European countries, and to Portugal. Our overview of the transition to democracy confirmed Therborn's (1977) contention that the working class, represented by socialist parties and trade unions, was the single most important force in the majority of countries in the final push for universal male suffrage and responsible government, though in several of the smallholding countries the small peasants or the urban middle class played the major role. The additional cases demonstrated that where the working class was weak due to the low level of industrialization and organization, as in Portugal, Hungary, Romania, Greece and to a lesser extent Poland and Estonia, this weakness was part of the explanation of the authoritarian outcome. By contrast, the strength of organized labour and the social democratic parties helps explain why democracy survived in Czechoslovakia and Finland.

However, the working class was by no means the only agent of democracy and nowhere could the working class accomplish democratization on its own or could it successfully defend democracy without allies. As a matter

of fact, the working class needed allies in the final push, and earlier suffrage extensions that incorporated substantial sections of the lower classes, rural and urban, were often led by other social groups, usually the urban middle class or small peasantry, with the working class playing only a supporting role. Moreover, the contribution of the working class to these reforms came in the form of artisanal agitation as often as through the action of the Second International parties and allied trade unions. As we have emphasized, where the working class was weak, as in most of Eastern Europe and in Portugal, or had few allies (for example, only the Catholic parties in Germany and Italy) or none (Austria), democracy was fragile and did not survive the interwar period.

The bourgeoisie, which appears as the natural carrier of democracy in the accounts of orthodox Marxists and, to a certain extent, of Moore, hardly lived up to this role. Only in a few cases (France, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia) did the bourgeoisie favour the final extensions of suffrage to the working class. Its contribution was to establish parliamentary government and the rule of law, but it did not do so in all cases. The bourgeoisie's resistance to the initial political incorporation of the working class and its support for working-class exclusion in some countries in the interwar period were clearly connected to working-class support for socialist parties. This factor introduces a subtle twist in the argument linking the strength of the working class to the introduction of democracy. A significant minority of the working class in Italy, Germany, Romania and Spain supported the communists and the communists were the dominant left party in Greece, and there is little doubt that these parties contributed to the breakdown of democracy. However, the example of Austrian social democracy, which was powerful, committed to socialism and democracy, indicates that it was not only, or even mostly, these parties' attitudes toward democracy but rather their demands for socialism that provoked an upper-class reaction.

The relationship between working-class strength and democracy can be summarized in the following way. A diachronic analysis within each of the countries under consideration here reveals that the growth of working-class organizational strength led to increased pressure for the introduction of democracy; a synchronic analysis across countries reveals that these pressures led to the development of stable democratic regimes where the working class found allies in other social groups, in most cases the middle classes or the peasantry. This view accounts for the essential elements of the process of transition in the countries that experienced an internally generated transition to democracy and in which democracy survived the interwar period. However, as the breakdown cases demonstrate, the middle classes are not invariably democratic forces. The middle classes and the peasantry played quite different roles in different countries. In some, such as the Scandinavian countries, they supported suffrage extension and allied with the working class. In others, such as Germany and Austria, they

formed the mass base for authoritarian movements which led to the downfall of democracy.

Explanation of the variation and differences among countries is where the Moore thesis comes in. In our previous analysis of Western Europe we found that agrarian class relations were the critical feature distinguishing those cases in which democracy broke down and those in which it survived: in those countries in which authoritarian regimes replaced democracies, a politically powerful body of large landholders had survived into the twentieth century, and historically these landholders were engaged in what Moore calls labour-repressive agriculture (see Table 3.2). None of the other countries fits this description: in the other large landholding case, in Britain, the large landowners did not employ labour-repressive techniques of labour control, and in the other cases the countryside was dominated by smallholders. In the analysis of the breakdown cases, we found that an alliance, or at least an accommodation, did develop among the state, labour-repressive landlords, and the bourgeoisie. However, in no case did the authoritarian coalition develop exactly along the lines outlined by Moore. The weakest point in Moore's analysis is his characterization of the bourgeoisie as the dependent partner in the coalition (see Table 3.2). In Italy, the bourgeoisie, not the landowners, was the politically dominant segment of the upper classes. Historical research on Imperial Germany questions the view that the bourgeoisie was politically dependent (Blackbourn and Eley 1984). Even in Spain, where the landed class was dominant in economic terms, it cannot be said that the bourgeoisie accepted the political leadership of the landed classes. Only Austria seems to fit Moore's characterization, and there the political and economic dependence of the German-Austrian bourgeoisie was, in the final analysis, cemented by its position in the multi-ethnic state. It appears that Moore's analysis on this point suffers from the unwarranted assumption that the capitalist class has natural pro-democratic tendencies emanating from its economic interests.

In order to evaluate fully the importance of the five factors listed in Table 3.2, it is necessary to examine the cases in which democracy survived. They are strikingly different. For reasons discussed by Moore, the British and French cases are different from the typical authoritarian path. The small European democracies are, however, diametrically opposed to Moore's paradigmatic cases. It is worth emphasizing how much of this difference can be traced to the historic patterns of landholding and agrarian class relations. First of all, as we have pointed out earlier, size, landholding patterns, and military strength were historically interrelated. With no large landholding class, labour-repressive agriculture was impossible (point 2 in the table); the bourgeoisie was *ipso facto* stronger than the landed class (point 3); and, for the same reason, it was not the dependent partner in a coalition. Because there was no agrarian oligarchy, a revolutionary break from the past was not necessary. Not only is state repressive capacity connected to

the size/great-power status/military strength complex, it also may be more directly related to agrarian class relations, as the Swedish case indicates. There, Tilton (1974: 568) argues that insufficient repressive capacity in general, and the absence of a standing professional army in particular, did play a role in the calculations of the conservatives at the point of their final capitulation in 1917. The weakness of the repressive apparatus, in turn, can be attributed in part to the influence of the peasants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as they used their influence in the lower house to block appropriations for defence, since these were connected to taxes that would fall on their backs (Rustow 1955; Verney 1957).

Extending the analysis to Eastern Europe and Portugal reveals further problems with the agrarian class relations thesis, even if we amended it to drop the requirement that the bourgeoisie be politically dependent on the agrarian upper class or weaker than the agrarian upper class. An examination of the characteristics of the countries in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicates that Czechoslovakia and Greece do not fit the thesis and an examination of the events of the interwar period indicate that Poland and Estonia are also problematic. We argued that Czechoslovakia and Estonia experience modern 'revolutionary breaks from the past' in which a new coercive force without links to the old regime was created and land reform transformed the countryside. This, along with the strength of the working class and the relatively liberal bourgeoisie explains the democratic outcome in Czechoslovakia. In Estonia, the breakdown does not follow the usual pattern, with the exclusion of the working-class movement being the result if not always the central goal of the authoritarian takeover. Rather, the suspension of elections was aimed at excluding the radical right from the political system. A relatively pluralistic if clearly non-democratic polity continued to exist. In Poland, a new army without links to old regimes was also created though no extensive land reform was ever carried out. The breakdown there cannot be linked to agrarian class relations even if the landed upper class was a beneficiary of the takeover. In Greece, the dominance of smallholding should have been a favourable condition for the development of democracy. There state-civil society relations, not class relations, appear to be the key to the authoritarian outcome as the low level of development and the clientelistic political system retarded the development of a strong civil society and the increasing political autonomy of the military created conditions favourable to military intervention in politics.

The 'revolutions' in Czechoslovakia and Estonia beg the question of why such revolutions displacing the military and reforming the landholding structure did not happen in the other authoritarian cases, thus paving the way for stable democratic regimes. Indeed, the question has often been asked about the German case from a variety of points of view (see for example Dahrendorf 1967; Harrington 1970). Two conditions distinguish these two cases from the Western European breakdown cases and Hungary.

First, there was no pre-existing state and the task was to create a new army rather than to displace an existing one. Second, in different ways, ethnic divisions in the old regime facilitated the outcome. In Estonia, the landed upper class was German and thus was isolated not only from the subordinate classes but also from the middle and upper classes in other sectors of the economy. In Bohemia and Moravia, the bourgeoisie was opposed to the Habsburg regime, which favoured the German-Austrian bourgeoisie, and thus was much more democratic than the urban upper class in neighbouring countries. So, counterintuitively, it was the recent histories of state building and ethnic divisions that explain the democratic revolutions in these two countries.

Notes

1. In the interwar period this generalization about the working class is harder to sustain, since the splits in the working class induced by the war and the Russian Revolution created anti-democratic minorities, above all the Communist parties, whose political posture clearly contributed to the breakdown of democracy. Moreover, as Linz (1978) points out, the radical posturing of maximalist socialists frightened the middle classes, contributing to the strengthening of the authoritarian forces, and even the moderate social democrats contributed to the outcome by inflexible postures vis-à-vis parties of the centre. This said, we think it is fair to say that all the parties of the social democratic left, which remained by far the largest of the working-class parties in every country, maintained a commitment to democracy. Their mistakes do not make them anti-democratic.
2. Note that the classifications in Table 3.2 refer to relationships in the polity in question and not the empire of which it is a part. For example, while the Finnish bourgeoisie might be conceived as weaker and dependent on the Russian agrarian upper elite, it was not weaker than the Finnish agrarian 'elite'.